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Abstract
Numerous studies have developed and analysed strategies for
maximising utility in social dilemmas from both an individual
agent’s perspective and more generally from the viewpoint of
a society. In this paper we bring this body of work together
by investigating the success of a wide range of strategies in
environments with varying characteristics, comparing their
success. In particular we study within agent-based simula-
tions, different interaction topologies, agents with and with-
out mobility, and strategies with and without adaptation in
the form of reinforcement learning, in both competitive and
cooperative settings represented by the Prisoner’s Dilemma
and the Stag Hunt, respectively. The results of our experi-
ments show that allowing agents mobility decreases the level
of cooperation in the society of agents, due to singular inter-
actions with individual opponents that limit the possibility for
direct reciprocity. Unstructured environments similarly sup-
port a greater number of singular interactions and thus higher
levels of defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the Stag
Hunt, strategies that prioritise risk taking show a greater level
of success regardless of environment topology. Our range
of experiments yield new insights into the role that mobility
and interaction topologies play in the study of cooperation in
agent societies.
Introduction
The extensive work on social dilemmas with self-interested
agents has focused mainly on agents whose opponents are in
an unchanging set, often represented as nodes in a network.
When mobility is introduced to these agents, their opponents
are no longer consistent since an interaction between any
two agents is not guaranteed nor are any subsequent interac-
tions. This paper explores what effects the move to agents
who have differing sets of opponents has on a strategy. We
are also interested to see if the outcomes of strategies change
when mobility is present in a social dilemma setting. In
addition we explore how the environment topology affects
these strategies, and how these effects are interlinked. Our
study is concerned with observing these effects in terms of
both an individual agent’s performance and the performance
of the society as a whole. The performance of an agent or a
society will be measured by the level of cooperation and the
overall payoff achieved.
Throughout this paper we refer to static and mobile
agents. A static agent refers to an agent which has a fixed
number of opponents and does not move throughout the
environment, which is modelled as a (static) network. A
mobile agent refers to an agent that moves throughout the
environment, modelled as an arena, and whose opponents
will change over time. Previous work has documented
what effects can arise when introducing mobility to agents
(Ranjbar-Sahraei et al., 2014). This work has shown with
mobile pure defectors and cooperators that when defectors
were in the minority they were successful in a small world
environment, but not in a regular environment. Collenette
et al. (2016b, 2017a) expanded on this to include random
and fully connected networks, along with random and empty
arenas. That work was concerned with the mobility effects
on the strategies implemented. Their results showed that
the performance of the strategies depends on the environ-
ment topology in which they were used. Collenette et al.
(2016b, 2017a) further showed that different densities of
mobile agents in an arena can change the observed effects.
The work described above has focused on observing a sin-
gle strategy in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, limiting the ability to
effectively analyse the effects mobile environment topolo-
gies have on social dilemmas and the society in general. We
wish to investigate the different levels of cooperation that
different self-interested strategies yield in a variety of envi-
ronments. By expanding the range of agents and topologies,
we will gain a greater insight into the external factors that
will affect all strategies. Using these insights we gain under-
standing of an agent’s behaviour when moving from a more
theoretical exercise to the real world.
To isolate these external factors we will be running a num-
ber of different experiments where we simulate a society
of self-interest agents. The agents will use a mix of differ-
ent strategies, including fixed strategies that do not change
over time, such as Tit-for-Tat, and adaptive strategies which
use reinforcement learning, including SARSA and a Moody
model. The arena shape for the mobile agents will be de-
signed to be comparable to the network representation used
for the static agents. We will then perform an analysis on the
Coop Defect
Coop 3, 3 0, 5
Defect 5, 0 1, 1
Coop Defect
Coop 3, 3 0, 2
Defect 2, 0 1, 1
Table 1: Payoff matrix of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Left) and
the Stag Hunt (Right).
level of cooperation the society has achieved along with the
average payoff of both the individual agent and for the whole
society. This analysis allows us to determine the effects of
mobility and the effects of different environments allowing
us to further expand on what needs to be taken into account
when designing agents that will be placed in an arena.
We find that mobile agents show a lower level of coop-
eration when compared to static agents. This is due to mo-
bile agents facing a larger range of opponents and interacting
with these opponents fewer times than static agents. Mobile
agents in an open arena will have a higher level of defection
than in arenas with more obstacles, however this only results
in an increase in the society’s payoff in Prisoner’s Dilemma
and not the Stag Hunt in our scenarios. This difference is
due to temptation payoff being higher than mutual coopera-
tion in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and lower in the Stag Hunt.
Background and Related Work
Social Dilemmas
Our study uses both the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Stag
Hunt games. In both these social dilemmas two players have
the choice of cooperation or defection. The choice is made
simultaneously and without prior communication. The pay-
offs for both dilemmas are shown in Table 1.
In both dilemmas, both players choosing to cooperate will
give the highest payoff for the group as a whole. In the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma there is a strong incentive for a player to
defect, which leads to a Nash Equilibrium of mutual defec-
tion, giving the worst outcome for the society. The Stag
Hunt (Skyrms, 2004) reduces the incentive to defect below
the payoff that an agent would get for mutual cooperation,
leading to two pure strategy Nash Equilibria. These are mu-
tual cooperation and mutual defection. Each equilibrium
has its own benefit and cost: if an agent chooses to coop-
erate there is the risk of losing all the payoff if the opponent
chooses to defect. When the agent chooses to defect there is
no chance of the agent losing its payoff, however it will have
given up the chance for the highest payoff, making this the
risk-dominant strategy.
Exploring how cooperation can evolve between groups of
self-interested agents has been an active topic of research
(Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Santos et al., 2008; Bloem-
bergen et al., 2014; Skyrms, 2004; Bolton et al., 2016). We
adopt this model of interaction so we can expand on the body
of knowledge in regards to how the nature of this interaction
changes when deployed in different environments.
Networks
Throughout this work we will be conducting experiments
with different interaction topologies, modelled as networks.
Each node in our networks will represent an agent with the
edges of the network allowing interactions to take place be-
tween the two connected agent nodes. In order to make a
meaningful analysis between mobile arenas and networked
interactions, we will be using the effective degree of the mo-
bile arena to construct our networks, where the degree is the
number of unique agents they faced in an arena.
We use networks with different structural properties in our
work, namely: Small world networks (Watts and Strogatz,
1998), which are networks with high clustering and small
characteristic path length, intuitively this is a network where
the nodes have very few neighbours but the distance between
any two given nodes is also small; the fully connected net-
work, also known as a complete network, in which every
node is connected to every other node; random networks,
where the edges of the network are randomly distributed;
and regular networks, in which all nodes have the same de-
gree. In this work we will focus on random regular net-
works, where the connections to specific nodes may differ,
but the degree of each node will be the same, allowing us to
make a meaningful comparison with the regular arena. We
acknowledge that scale-free networks are an important part
of exploring network interactions (Baraba´si, 2009), however
we wish to expand upon the current knowledge, by allowing
direct comparisons with previous work.
Collenette et al. (2016b); Ranjbar-Sahraei et al. (2014)
focused on analysing a small subset of possible strategies,
within regular and small world environments. Collenette
et al. (2017a) provide an initial analysis on random and
empty environments. The aim of this work is to generalise
these effects for social dilemma scenarios. Ranjbar-Sahraei
et al. (2014) showed that there is a difference between reg-
ular and small world arenas for the Prisoner’s Dilemma; ex-
ploring this difference allows us to better consider the suc-
cess of the strategies utilised. We can then use the found
differences to better evaluate these strategies when moving
from the more theoretical background of static networks to
the “agents in the field” type of arenas. Previous work has
shown that decreasing the available area to move around in
arenas with the same topology reduces the variance in payoff
between agents Collenette et al. (2017a, 2016b).
When considering the Prisoner’s Dilemma in networks,
previous work has shown that as the network connectivity
increases in regular and small-world, the level of coopera-
tion decreases, matching the Nash Equilibrium (Santos and
Pacheco, 2005; Lieberman et al., 2005; Vukov et al., 2006;
Barrat and Weigt, 2000). In random networks the level of
cooperation in networks with low connectivity depends on
the initial conditions of the agents. When the connectivity
is high, the level of cooperation is independent of the ini-
tial conditions (Dura´n and Mulet, 2005). For the Stag Hunt
we see similar results where the level of cooperation is de-
pendant on the network structure, with more connected net-
works showing lower levels of cooperation (Szolnoki and
Perc, 2009; Starnini et al., 2011).
Strategies
In our experiments we will be including a number of differ-
ent strategies, which we have split into two different types.
The first type we define is the fixed strategies, which have
a deterministic outcome. Secondly, we define the adaptive
strategies which use reinforcement learning as part of their
strategy. The fixed strategies include:
Tit-For-Tat (TFT) Initially cooperates, then copies the op-
ponent’s last action (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981);
Win-Stay Lose-Shift (WSLS) Initially cooperates, repeat-
ing the current action as long as it receives the highest
payoff possible (Nowak et al., 1993);
Random Cooperates or defects with equal chance;
Always Cooperate (ALL COOP) Always cooperates;
Always Defect (ALL DEFECT) Always defects;
Emotional - Active Shown to be the most effective emo-
tional strategy in an arena (Collenette et al., 2016a,b).
This strategy will switch to cooperation when the oppo-
nent has cooperated twice in a row, and switch to defec-
tion when the opponent defects, named E2 in previous
works (Lloyd-Kelly et al., 2012b,a);
Emotional - Trustful Identified as the most effective emo-
tional strategy in a network (Lloyd-Kelly et al., 2012a,b),
named E7 in that work. This strategy will switch to co-
operation when the opponent cooperates, and switch to
defection when the opponent defects three times in a row.
The adaptive strategies use reinforcement learning as their
strategy. Reinforcement learning uses trial and error to learn
about its environment and how to optimise agents’ actions
based on the current state of the environment, in order to
yield the greatest payoff for themselves. Actions that return
the highest payoff are reinforced, whereas actions which re-
turn a low payoff or punishments are reduced. For our ex-
periments the states will be the opponents. The two adaptive
strategies are:
SARSA This is an on-policy reinforcement learning algo-
rithm (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Definition 1 shows the
Q-Value update algorithm.
Definition 1. Let S be the set of states with s ∈ S. Let
A be the set of actions with a ∈ A. Let t be the time,
r represent the reward, α the learning step size and γ the
discount factor of future rewards. Then, SARSA updates
Q(st, at) using the following equation:
Q(st, at)← Q(st, at) + α[rt+1 + γQ(st+1, at+1)
−Q(st, at)]
(1)
Moody This is also a reinforcement learning algorithm that
uses a model of mood in both its action selection and es-
timation of future rewards (Collenette et al., 2017b). Def-
inition 2 gives the Q-Value update algorithm
Definition 2. Let Memai be the set of rewards obtained
by agent i when using action a where |Memai | is at max-
imum 20, and Memai (0) returns the most recent reward.
Let mi return the mood of agent i.
Q(st, at)← Q(st, at) + α[rt+1 + γΨ−Q(st, at)]
Ψ =
(
n
β∑
0
Memai (n)
)
/β
β = ceil(|Memai |/αi)
αi = (100−mi)/100
(2)
Equation 2 shows how the moody agent evaluates its ex-
pected payoff by taking the average of the previous inter-
actions for that agent and action, where Memai is an array
of payoffs from each agent and action pair. How far back
the agent looks is adjusted by the mood level, with higher
moods looking at fewer previous interactions. For example
if the mood (mi) is 25 then β is 75% of the number times
the agent has faced an opponent. Ψ is the mean payoff the
agent received against that opponent and action for the last
75% interactions with that opponent.
For the emotional strategies the initial action will be split
equally between cooperation and defection. For the adap-
tive strategies the initial action will have an equal chance
of cooperation or defection. The adaptive strategies’ initial
Q value for an action will be set to the first payoff they re-
ceive for that state action pair. We do this as Shteingart et al.
(2013) shows that this best reflects how people learn which
action to take when given a choice between a risky or safe
option. Collenette et al. (2017b) states that reflecting psy-
chology is a requirement for the moody strategy and apply-
ing this to SARSA allows a meaningful comparison between
them.
In our adaptive agent the action selection strategy will
use the -greedy method, which selects a random action
with probability , and the action with the highest Q-Value
with probability 1 − . We set  = 0.1 for both adaptive
agents. The moody strategy can adapt the value of  de-
pending on the value of the mood: when the agent is in a
neutral mood, no change will be made.  increases in line
with how strongly the mood is felt, and gives a change of
changing an action that is in conflict with the current mood
Figure 1: Fully connected, Regular, Small World, and Ran-
dom environments (left to right). Example networks (top)
and corresponding arenas (bottom)
of an agent. When the mood is high and the agent is defect-
ing,  increases the chance of cooperation. When the mood
is low and the agent is cooperating,  increases the change
of defection. Collenette et al. (2017b) gives the formal def-
initions of the algorithm. We have altered one step of the
mood update algorithm so that the mood reduces quicker
when a poor outcome is obtained at high mood levels. This
is achieved by altering the mood by the difference between
the reward and the perceived average. Previously the reward
was altered by the difference between the perceived average
and the actual average. This is shown in Definition 3, which
shows how the mood level goes up by the size of the payoff,
including any adjustments that the Homo Egualis equation
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) makes to the agent’s perception of
the reward. The Homo Egualis equation is an inequity aver-
sion model, which models what the value received would
be perceived as, when taking into context what other people
have received.
Definition 3. Let I be the set of agents where i, j ∈ I where
j is the opponent, mi be the mood of agent i, t denotes
time. rti denotes the payoff of agent i at time t. Ω
t
i,j de-
notes the Homo Egualis equation (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999)
for agents’ i and j at time t.
mti = m
t−1
i + (r
t−1
i − Ωt−1i,j ) (3)
The agents will be able to differentiate between oppo-
nents, each strategy will be applied to each agent individ-
ually and for the adaptive agents the opponent will represent
the state. We set the learning rate as α = 0.1 and the dis-
count rate to γ = 0.95.
Experiment Setup
As previously noted, the environments we will be conduct-
ing our experiments in are using the fully connected, reg-
ular, small world, and random networks. Examples of the
networks are shown in Figure 1. A fully connected network
is equivalent to an empty environment (no blocks), as the
agents have an equal chance of meeting any other agent.
In the random environment 20 blocks are placed randomly
around the environment, leaving 36% of the environment
available for movement. For the static equivalent we will use
the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi method (Erdo˝s and Re´nyi, 1959) to gener-
ate a random network with a component of one, where each
edge has a 36% chance of being generated.
To calculate the degree needed to generate the random
regular network, we obtain the average number of unique
opponents faced by an agent in the mobile arena. To ensure
that this number is an accurate representation, we exclude
any opponents who are faced once only. We use the algo-
rithm described by Steger and Wormald (1999) which gen-
erates a random regular network in a relatively quick time
(Kim and Vu, 2003), also we ensure the graph has a com-
ponent of one. Using the method for obtaining the degree
as before, we construct the random small world network us-
ing the Watts-Strogatz method (Watts and Strogatz, 1998).
This is constructed as a ring network where the edges in the
graph have a rewiring probability of 40%. That is, each con-
nection has a 40% chance of changing to a different agent.
Examples of each of the static networks are given in Fig-
ure 1. Where a 0% rewiring probability is a ring network
and a 100% rewiring probability is a random network, with
any number between producing a small world network.
Our experiments use 108 agents each using a single strat-
egy. Each strategy will be represented equally. The agents’
initial positions are randomised for each run, in both the net-
work and the mobile arenas. In the arenas, shown in Fig-
ure 1, the agents move randomly around the environment.
The agents have basic obstacle avoidance and generate a
random heading between -45◦ and 45◦ each second to al-
low a random walk. An interaction occurs when two agents
are facing each other and are closer than 20cm. Interac-
tions may happen after each second, after which they are
given two seconds where they may not interact. This pre-
vents agents having more than one interaction while they
are passing each other. The arenas will be simulated using
e-pucks (Mondada et al., 2009) in Stage (Vaughan, 2008).
The mobile agents will interact for 20 minutes, then the po-
sitions will be re-initialised while the agents will retain any
knowledge they have accumulated, to allow agents sufficient
chance to meet a range of opponents. We stop the simulation
once the agents have converged. To calculate if convergence
has occurred we take the proportions of mutual cooperation,
mutual defection, and non-mutual outcomes of the 30 most
recent 20-minute runs. We then compare this to the 10 most
recent 20-minute runs and we say that convergence has oc-
curred if the difference between the proportions calculated
is within 0.005 of each other. We repeat the simulation 50
times in order to generate an accurate result on what propor-
tions of actions the agents converge on.
For the networked experiments, the agents’ positions are
randomised in the network. As time has no true meaning
in the network, an agent will interact with every neighbour
the average number of times the mobile equivalent interacts
with a specific agent. For example, if in the arena an agent
will average 3 interactions with a specific opponent, then in
the networked environment the agent will interact with each
neighbour 3 times. This counts as a run, we then use the
same convergence properties as before.
Hypotheses
We predict that networks will be more successful in support-
ing cooperation when compared to the arenas; this is hypoth-
esis 1 (H1). This prediction is due to agents being able to re-
taliate against exploitative agents in a reliable manner, ensur-
ing that cooperative agents will both receive a high average
payoff as a pair. In arenas there is no guarantee that agents
will meet the same agent more than once, allowing exploita-
tive agents to be successful, as the opponent is unable to
retaliate. We predict that this will lead to successful arena
strategies being those which take advantage of agents met
rarely while cooperating with agents met frequently. The
TFT and Trustful strategies are effective in maintaining co-
operation over time, and depending on their initial action can
be effective in taking advantage in a one-shot interaction.
We expect there to be differences between the environ-
ments in terms of which environments support the highest
levels of payoff. Collenette et al. (2016a, 2017a) have shown
high levels of mobility are a factor in supporting higher lev-
els of average payoff in arenas with mobile agents. That
work leads us to expect that the empty environment will sup-
port the highest levels of average payoff; this is hypothesis 2
(H2). While the empty arena is represented by the fully con-
nected network, we expect this network to achieve the lowest
amount of cooperation and therefore payoff, as Lieberman
et al. (2005) show on networked interactions; this is hypoth-
esis 3 (H3).
Results and Analysis
We examine the level of cooperation achieved by the soci-
ety in each environment. Figure 2 show the results for the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (Top) and the Stag Hunt (Bottom). The
level of cooperation is given as a percentage where 100%
represents that every outcome was mutual cooperation for
that particular run. These figures support our hypothesis
H3, as in both the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt the
network with the least amount of cooperation was the Fully
Connected network. The level of cooperation increases with
the level of randomness in the network construction, further
supporting our hypothesis H3, and Lieberman et al. (2005).
In addition we note that arenas have a consistently lower
level of cooperation and take longer to converge when com-
pared to networked interactions (H1). To explore why this is
the case, we look into the main difference between the two
environments, namely the number of unique opponents the
agents will face. Figure 3 shows a histogram of how many
unique opponents an agent faced, for each arena. Overlaying
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Figure 2: Proportion of mutual cooperation for each run, in
each of the environments, for the agents playing the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (Top) and the Stag Hunt (Bottom).
is a second histogram which excludes any opponent they in-
teracted with exactly once. When an agent interacts with an
opponent exactly once we term this a singular interaction.
When we include the singular interactions, the range of
agents faced does not line up with the expected distributions
for the different arena structures. Across the networks we
would expect a singular peak in the histogram which would
lean further right as the arena becomes more open. Ex-
cluding the singular interactions these figures show that the
shape of the environment affects the number of opponents as
would be expected, with an agent in the empty environment
interacting with the largest range of agents and the random
environment facing the smallest range, in-line with expecta-
tions as this mimics the static networks. A significant fac-
tor can be seen in how the number of opponents decreases
greatly when we exclude singular interactions.
What the above means for the agents is that when mobil-
ity is introduced there are effectively both the iterative so-
cial dilemmas and one-shot social dilemmas being played
at same time, with no knowledge on which is being played.
Agents are able to take advantage of some opponents with-
out retaliation, allowing defectors to go unpunished. Mutual
cooperation is harder to sustain as cooperating agents can
effectively be split up, as they may not interact with each
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Figure 3: Histogram of unique opponents faced in the empty,
regular, small world, and random environments (top to bot-
tom), including and excluding singular interactions
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Figure 4: Average Scores for each environment in the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (Top) and the Stag Hunt (Bottom)
other again. The average range of opponents is 89 (14.65
standard difference) in the mobile arenas, with an average
of 76.5 (32 standard difference) in the static environments.
The larger range of opponents in the mobile environment ex-
tends the convergence time, along with the irregular number
of interactions with a specific opponent.
Payoffs
To analyse hypothesis H2 and H3 we look at Figure 4 which
shows the average score of the society of agents in the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (left) and the Stag Hunt (right), for each
environment. The results in these figures allow us to reach
an initial conclusion on hypothesises H2 and H3.
For hypothesis H3 we see that the fully connected net-
work performed the worst with more randomised networks
achieving higher scores in both the Prisoner’s Dilemma and
the Stag Hunt, validating this hypothesis. Hypothesis H2,
where we expected the empty environment to perform best,
is supported for the Prisoner’s Dilemma but not for the Stag
Hunt. This leads us to the conclusion that there does not
seem to be a rule to directly relate the environment structure
and the average payoff. Rather than focusing on whether
there exists an environment which can affect the payoff di-
rectly, we shall analyse why two different social dilemmas
yield different orderings (in terms of society payoff) for
the different arenas, by looking deeper into the form of the
games, and the effects on individual strategies.
We show the average scores of each strategy in each envi-
ronment along with what percentage of their chosen actions
was to cooperate, for the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Stag
Hunt, in Table 2. This allows us to see whether a majority of
cooperation or a majority of defection is the most successful
in our environments.
We see in the Prisoner’s Dilemma that fully cooperative
agents perform the worst. The empty arena supports high
levels of average payoff for strategies that choose defection
more often. This defection is not supported in the Stag Hunt,
which supports cooperative strategies. This is due to the
temptation payoff being higher than the mutual cooperation
payoff for an individual agent in the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
since the empty arena supports a large range of opponents,
with a significant number of them being one-shot interac-
tions. The agent that defects does not receive any retaliation
allowing it to achieve high levels of payoff. The more coop-
erative agents do not receive a reduction in payoff as large
as the increase in payoff that less cooperative agents receive
in the other arenas, allowing the empty arena to yield the
highest average payoff.
The above effect is not seen in the Stag Hunt as the temp-
tation payoff is less than the mutual cooperation payoff.
Since defecting still receives less retaliation in the empty
arena this does not result in the increased payoff that would
be expected in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In general we see
that the environment has less of an effect on the strategies in
the Stag Hunt. This highlights how the payoff matrix of a so-
cial dilemma and the environment are interlinked. We note
that TFT was the most successful as per Axelrod and Hamil-
ton (1981), and that Trustful was also a successful strategy
across both social dilemmas, supporting H1 further.
Conclusion
We have conducted experiments with a number of different
strategies, evaluating them in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and
the Stag Hunt games. The agents have played the games in
a number of different network topologies and their equiva-
lent arenas with mobile agents. Through these experiments
we have shown how arenas lower the average payoff, the
level of cooperation, and increase convergence times when
compared to the equivalent static network. We can attribute
this to an inherent property of mobility in an arena, namely
the range of opponents that will be faced and how a number
of them will only be faced once, effectively making them
one-shot interactions and thus limiting an agent’s ability to
retaliate against defection.
We have shown that the more open an arena, the larger
the range of opponents and number of singular interactions.
For an agent to take advantage of the lack of retaliation, the
payoff matrix needs to also support defection over cooper-
ation for an individual agent. The Prisoner’s Dilemma has
this support so defecting agents achieve high levels of pay-
off in the empty arena. Conversely the Stag Hunt does not
have this support as the temptation payoff is lower than the
mutual outcome payoff for an individual agent.
We believe that our results are relevant for agent designers
transferring theoretical network interactions into real world
practical environments. Future work will consider a wider
range of environment topologies to support this aim by fur-
ther generalising the work.
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